The politics of self-help: The Rockefeller Foundation, philanthropy and the 'long' Green Revolution by Nally, David & Taylor, S
                             Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for Political Geography 
                                  Manuscript Draft 
 
 
Manuscript Number: PG-1787R2 
 
Title: The politics of self-help: The Rockefeller Foundation, philanthropy and the 'long' Green 
Revolution  
 
Article Type: Full Length Article 
 
Keywords: Agricultural Development; Governmentality; Modernisation; Philanthropy; Political 
Economy; Rockefeller Foundation 
 
Corresponding Author: Dr. David Nally,  
 
Corresponding Author's Institution: University of Cambridge 
 
First Author: David Nally 
 
Order of Authors: David Nally; Stephen Taylor 
 
Abstract: While scholars of contemporary philanthropy have observed a concerted interest in the 
promotion of 'self-help,' little has been said about the political history of this investment and its 
significance in determining both domestic and international development priorities. We locate this 
modern conceptualisation of self-help in early twentieth-century philanthropic practice that sought to 
'gift' to individuals and communities the precious habit of self-reliance and social autonomy. The 
Rockefeller Foundation promoted rural development projects that deliberately sought to 'emancipate' 
the tradition-bound peasant, transforming him or her into a productive, enterprising subject. We begin 
by documenting their early agricultural extension work, which attempted to spark agrarian change in 
the US South through the inculcation of modern habits and aspirations among farmers and their 
families. These agrarian schemes illustrate the newfound faith that 'rural up-lift' could only be 
sustained if farming communities were trained to 'help themselves' by investing physically and 
psychologically in the process of modernisation. We then locate subsequent attempts to incentivise 
and accelerate international agricultural development within the broader geopolitical imperatives of 
the Green Revolution and the Cold War. While US technical assistance undoubtedly sought to prevent 
political upheaval in the Third World, we argue that Rockefeller-led modernisation projects, based on 
insights gleaned from behavioural economics, championed a model of human capital - and the idea of 
'revolution within' - in order to contain the threat of  'revolution without'. Approaching agricultural 
development through this problematisation of the farmer reveals the 'long history' of the Green 
Revolution - unfolding from the domestic to the international and from the late nineteenth century to 
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The politics of self-help: 
The Rockefeller Foundation, philanthropy and the ‘long’ Green Revolution  
ABSTRACT 
 
While scholars of contemporary philanthropy have observed a concerted interest in the 
promotion of „self-help,‟ little has been said about the political history of this investment and 
its significance in determining both domestic and international development priorities. We 
locate this modern conceptualisation of self-help in early twentieth-century philanthropic 
practice that sought to „gift‟ to individuals and communities the precious habit of self-reliance 
and social autonomy. The Rockefeller Foundation promoted rural development projects that 
deliberately sought to „emancipate‟ the tradition-bound peasant, transforming him or her into 
a productive, enterprising subject. We begin by documenting their early agricultural extension 
work, which attempted to spark agrarian change in the US South through the inculcation of 
modern habits and aspirations among farmers and their families. These agrarian schemes 
illustrate the newfound faith that „rural up-lift‟ could only be sustained if farming 
communities were trained to „help themselves‟ by investing physically and psychologically in 
the process of modernisation. We then locate subsequent attempts to incentivise and 
accelerate international agricultural development within the broader geopolitical imperatives 
of the Green Revolution and the Cold War. While US technical assistance undoubtedly 
sought to prevent political upheaval in the Third World, we argue that Rockefeller-led 
modernisation projects, based on insights gleaned from behavioural economics, championed a 
model of human capital – and the idea of „revolution within‟ – in order to contain the threat of  
„revolution without‟. Approaching agricultural development through this problematisation of 
the farmer reveals the „long history‟ of the Green Revolution – unfolding from the domestic 
to the international and from the late nineteenth century to the present – as well as the 
continuing role of philanthropy in forging a new global order. 
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 [I]t might be said that the first commandment of the entrepreneur‟s ethics is 
„help thyself‟ and that in this sense it is an ethic of „self-help.‟ It will rightly be 
said that this ethic is not new; that it forms part of the spirit of capitalism from 
the start. 
- Dardot & Laval, 2013, 264 
 
This after all is the basic question. Not how is society organized, but what 
stimulates change? Not who visits whom but what makes communication 
evocative? Not how is stability maintained, but how can constructive instability 
be provoked? Not what is the norm, but how can the deviant be more effective? 
How can aspirations and self-confidence be heightened? How can the creativity 
of persons be unleashed? What can make society sing and ring with zest and 
power?  
- Mosher, 1976, 348 
FIND THE MAN, RIGHT THE WORLD 
  
On June 5 1958, venture capitalist and philanthropist, Laurance Spelman Rockefeller (1910-
2004) arrived at The Buckley School, New York, where he had been invited to deliver a 
commencement address. Rockefeller, a scion of the influential industrial family and trustee of 
numerous subsidiary philanthropies of the family-led Rockefeller Foundation (see Fosdick, 
1952; Harr & Johnson, 1988; Harr & Johnson, 1991), was keen for his young audience to 
understand that the next step in their careers would be challenging and potentially life-
defining. As young adults the students assembled in the room had now to decide what sort of 
person they wanted to become, what core values they stood for, and how they would 
personally contribute to building a better future. With his audience‟s attention secured 
Rockefeller reinforced his point by recounting the story of a „harassed father‟ attempting to 
read his newspaper despite the distracting antics of his son.  
 
In desperation to get a few moments of peace and quiet, the father grabbed a map 
of the world lying near at hand and with a pair of scissors cut it up into a number 
of odd shaped pieces. Turning to the boy he said, “Here, see how long it takes 
you to put this together.” In an incredibly short time the youngster was back with 
the map properly pieced together. The father was amazed and none too pleased. 
He said, “How could you have possibly done it so fast?” The boy replied, “Dad, 
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I found that there was a picture of a man on the back side of the map which made 
it easy to put together. You see when the man was right, the world was right.” 
(Rockefeller, 1958, 2) 
 
To a room full of precocious young scholars this allegory must have made a striking 
impression. It certainly epitomised a newfound faith at the Rockefeller Foundation that before 
philanthropy could accomplish its bold objective of „reforming the world‟ it would first have 
to convince people that the patterns of change it championed were both necessary and 
desirable (Sealander, 1997; Tyrrell, 2010; Zunz, 2012). In short, to improve the world one 
had first to mould the man. This conviction derived in part from ideas articulated by the 
industrialist and pioneer philanthropist Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919). In an article titled 
„Wealth,‟ first published in the North American Review in 1889, Carnegie argued for a new 
way of thinking about the „proper administration‟ of capital. Beginning with the assumption 
that the „laws of competition‟ were natural and overwhelmingly beneficial to society, 
Carnegie nevertheless claimed that capitalist societies had to undertake some redistribution of 
wealth if they are to avoid enormous, polarising inequality and the likelihood of a socialist 
revolution. For Carnegie (1900, 23) the difficulty lay in the fact that „most of the forms in 
vogue to-day for benefiting mankind only tend to spread among the poor a spirit of 
dependence upon alms, when what is essential for progress is that they should be inspired to 
depend upon their own exertions‟. Faced with such problems „the best means of benefiting 
the community,‟ Carnegie (1900, 18) concluded, „is to place within its reach the ladders upon 
which the aspiring can rise‟. As Carnegie saw it, the objective of philanthropy was to 
thoroughly restructure free-market capitalism, not in order to destroy it, but rather to save it 
from itself (see Dardot & Laval, 2013, 37). For capitalism to survive, it must embrace the 
strategic practice of gift giving. 
Carnegie‟s enormously popular essay stated two principles that have guided 
philanthropic practice ever since. The first is the conviction that charity is not the answer to 
poverty; indeed it is the problem. This principle is neither original nor specific to 
philanthropic practice (Bornstein 2009). In fact, the idea may be traced back to classical 
liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-
1834) who believed that the primary purpose of poor relief was to rehabilitate the poor, 
returning them to society minus the „vices‟ that caused their indigence in the first place (see 
Nally, 2011). The second conviction follows from this pathologization of poverty; namely, to 
achieve progressive and lasting change, personal as well as political transformation is 
required. New laws, powers and rationalities of rule in themselves will not suffice. To truly 
tackle poverty it is necessary to rouse the poor and entice them to better standards of living. 
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Both principles were to become cardinal features of American philanthropic practice. 
„The best philanthropy,‟ commented Standard Oil magnate John D. Rockefeller Sr. (1839-
1937), „is constantly in search of the finalities – a search for cause, an attempt to cure evils at 
their source‟ (cited in Rockefeller Foundation, 1968, n.p.). This quest for „the finalities‟ went 
hand in hand with a hardened belief that „lasting gains come not from help but from self-
help,‟ as Rockefeller Foundation Vice-President Will M. Myers remarked (Harrar, 1967, vii). 
The recipients of philanthropic largesse had to be actively enrolled in the process of securing 
their own salvation. Whereas charity addressed only the symptoms of social problems – and 
therefore tended to promote dependency – philanthropy would tackle root causes and inspire 
social autonomy. In short, philanthropy‟s greatest „gift‟ was to provide a means of lifting 
communities out of squalor, whilst at the same time instilling in them feelings of „usefulness‟ 
and habits of self-reliance (traits that Carnegie [1900, ix] termed „the germ of true manhood‟).  
Philanthropists such as Carnegie and Rockefeller also shared an enduring faith in 
progress and a belief that human nature is malleable and thus people can be worked on and 
nurtured to greater accomplishments. No doubt this „modernization of the idea of helping,‟ to 
borrow a phrase from philosopher Marianne Gronemeyer (2010, 57), drew from, and was 
validated by, historical patterns of thought (Lambert & Lester, 2004). However, drawing on 
research on the emerging geographies of philanthropy (Hay & Muller, 2014; see also 
McGoey, 2011), we suggest that it is just as important to recognise how the impulse to give 
was, and indeed is, shaped by the vagaries of contemporary politics. We noted above, for 
instance, that Carnegie‟s desire to delve beyond charity was driven by his fear that massive 
concentrated wealth, if administered unwisely, might inspire dangerous and destabilising 
class tensions. Significantly, the Rockefeller Foundation‟s philanthropy was also motivated 
by fears of population growth, dwindling resources, peasant insurgency and communism (see 
Kay, 1993; Cueto, 2007; Cullather, 2014). To control and contain these emergent threats – 
that is, to prevent them from spiralling into large-scale existential crises – it was necessary to 
manage the pace and direction of national and global social change. At this point we argue 
that philanthropic strategies begin to dovetail with wider security imperatives – often to the 
point that it becomes difficult to tease apart geopolitical objectives from philanthropic values 
(Parmar, 2012; Birn, 2006; Cullather, 2010). Drawing inspiration from Gronemeyer (2010) 
once more, one might say that the modernization of „helping‟ involved converting a mode of 
assistance (philanthropy) into an instrument of securitisation (see also Fassin, 2012). 
It is not, of course, novel to point to the „hidden,‟ strategic dimension of giving. 
Jonathan Benthall notes, for example, that „[g]iving is a form of exchange. The types of 
reciprocity that reimburse the charitable donor are not necessarily material, but may consist in 
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prestige, or of the blessings for the recipient, or of spiritual merit‟ (2010, xiv). At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel (1965 [1908], 122) put the matter baldly 
when he argued that the ministration of aid, far from being the solution to poverty, was part of 
its perpetuation: „The goal of assistance,‟ he wrote, „is precisely to mitigate certain extreme 
manifestations of social differentiation, so that the social structure may continue to be based 
on this differentiation.‟ Our aim in this paper is not to recapitulate Carnegie‟s earlier point, or 
indeed subsequent theorisation of that argument (Žižek, 2009; Morvaridi, 2012), but to 
develop a clearer picture of how „help‟ – or, more precisely, „self-help‟ – enters into the 
sphere of strategic calculation. To this end, we take seriously the tactics deployed by agents 
of the Rockefeller Foundation in pioneering domestic and international agricultural reform 
during the twentieth century. Intersecting with, and indeed adding to, technical and 
institutional accounts of the Green Revolution (Pearse, 1990; Yapa, 1993; Jarosz, 2009), this 
paper argues that the pursuit of agricultural modernisation generated novel strategies of „life 
adjustment‟ whose objective was to align rural values with market relations. By reaching out 
to the farmer and moulding „his‟ behaviour (we will have more to say about the gendering of 
those efforts momentarily), Rockefeller agents sought to manage and direct change on the 
farm. We explore, in other words, how the modification of farmer conduct becomes a proxy 
for reforming wider agrarian practices (we fully acknowledge that such powers of 
intervention also target non-humans, but this practice is beyond the purview of the present 
paper). In our view, the deployment of philanthropic strategies to „end hunger‟ and accelerate 
agrarian change invokes, and makes use of, forms of power that act on the physical and 
psychological components that shape human subject formation. By imparting to farmers the 
desire to behave as enterprising and prudential subjects – forward thinking, task-oriented, 
utility maximising, risk-taking, and so on – this mode of power incites desirable behaviour, 
and, just as crucially, the means for its perpetuation. As one experienced Rockefeller 
employee put it: „The aim of those who help should be to make their help unnecessary‟ 
(Calkins, 1951, 10). 
 
Drawing on theorists of governmental rule (Foucault, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008; 
Rose, 1999), we note the importance of the theory of „human capital‟ to this mode of „self-
regulation.‟ Philosopher Michel Feher (2009) argues that the concept of „human capital‟ 
emerges in the 1960s through the writings of economists such as Theodore W. Schultz (1902-
1998) and Gary S. Becker (1930-2014), but later broadens and becomes embroiled in 
neoliberal modes of governance that exhort self-realisation and reinforce norms of social 
autonomy (see Schultz, 1959; 1972; Becker, 1993). For Feher (2009, 34), neoliberal 
governmentality – perfectly captured by former US President William Jefferson Clinton‟s 
nostrum of „helping people to help themselves‟ – differs substantially from liberal rule in so 
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far as it presupposes a speculative rather than a possessive relationship with the self. Whereas 
„labor power is the property of the free laborer,‟ Feher (2009, 34) writes, „neoliberal subjects 
do not exactly own their human capital; they invest in it‟ (see also Read, 2009). As insightful 
as Feher‟s analysis is, we must depart from his equating of „human capital‟ – and its 
investments in „self-help‟ – exclusively with neoliberalism. Indeed Clinton‟s rhetorical 
question: how „to help people help themselves,‟ which Feher makes much of, was obviously 
central to the much earlier thought of Andrew Carnegie, and as we shall see, it was also a 
cornerstone of strategic thinking at the Rockefeller Foundation. In other words, it is clear to 
us that the ideology of „self-help‟ – the notion that one ought to be active in one‟s own 
development and be a „doctor to oneself‟ – historically predates neoliberalism (indeed in 
Michel Foucault‟s [1997] influential genealogy, „technologies of the self‟ are a conspicuous 
feature of ancient Greek and Roman thought). However, what interests us is less the „origins‟ 
of this idea than its recrudescence in the twentieth century, particularly as it is taken up in the 
development initiatives of big philanthropy. The uptake of self-help as a strategic mode of 
investment also explains why modern philanthropy placed so much faith in the redemptive 
power of capitalist markets (leading some critics to decry the spread of „philanthrocapitalism‟ 
[McGoey, 2011]). According to the classical liberal framing, the market is defined as a self-
regulating system – an „invisible hand‟ that automatically adjusts both supply and demand.  
Logically enough the idea of a natural, self-adjusting market proved attractive to reformers 
hoping to catalyse „self-sustaining‟ change without resorting to draconian measures. In other 
words, markets hold the promise of governance without government: a way of achieving 
independence and self-sovereignty in daily social life. It is hardly surprising, then, that the 
modern philanthropic impulse to raise poor peasants out of poverty was based on the principle 
that sociocultural differences, while an obstacle to development, were not a „natural limit‟ to 
enlightened self-progress. With thought and care the disinterested peasant could be made into 
an industrious and thriving farm worker. This, in fact, was the philanthropist‟s mission – to 
realise the potential of „human capital.‟ Or to say this differently: the longstanding goal of 
putting the peasant in the market was supplemented by the new, more radical aim of putting 
the market in the peasant.  
HOME TRUTHS: S. A. KNAPP AND THE POLITICS OF RURAL UPLIFT 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the Rockefeller-sponsored Green Revolution marked the 
commencement of international programmes of agrarian modernisation (Perkins, 1990; 
Cullather, 2010). However, efforts to boost rural livelihoods actually began domestically and 
much earlier in the twentieth century through the activities of a Rockefeller subsidiary 
philanthropy, the General Education Board (GEB). We thus follow author and activist Raj 
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Patel (2013) in arguing for a greater appreciation of a „long‟ Green Revolution, although in 
contradistinction to Patel, we extend the conventional chronology of the Green Revolution 
backwards as well as forwards in time. Accepting this chronology, the U.S. South becomes a 
strategic site and testing ground for the development of modernisation theory, international 
political economy and global statecraft as they applied to agriculture (Ring, 2012). 
 
 In 1903, John D. Rockefeller Sr. founded the GEB to finance improved public 
education and to promote economic development that would lift poor American farmers, 
especially those located in Southern states, out of poverty (Fosdick, 1962; see also Mitchell & 
Lowe, 1990; Malczewski, 2013). Early GEB work on health education convinced the Board 
leaders that they needed to bring nutrition and agrarian practices into the field of social 
reform. Frederick T. Gates (1853-1929), Rockefeller‟s key philanthropic advisor, asked staff 
whether there was a practical and effective way to promote modern methods of scientific 
farming. Wallace Buttrick (1853-1926), another agent of Rockefeller philanthropy and later 
Secretary of the GEB, was tasked with finding an answer to Gates‟ question (Fosdick, 1962, 
40). Buttrick undertook extensive tours of the US, but he was unable to find a model that met 
with Gates‟ criteria. Close to giving up, Buttrick met with David Houston (1866-1940), then 
president of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, who during their meeting 
remarked, „Buttrick, you came at the right time. We have two universities in Texas. One is at 
Austin and the other is Dr. Seaman Knapp. He is here now‟ (cited in Fosdick, 1962, 41). 
 
Seaman Asahel Knapp (1833-1911) had by that point spent over 20 years working as 
a farmer, preacher and educator (Cline, 1970). He had made a name for himself as the pioneer 
of a „teaching-by-doing‟ model of agricultural improvement; a blueprint that would form the 
cornerstone of what was later known as „farm demonstration‟ work (Waterhouse, 2013). In 
1898, he began collaborating with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to tackle the 
problem of rural stagnation in the US South and the specific threat posed by the boll weevil to 
the cotton harvest (Giesen, 2011). The federal government was providing the funds for 
Knapp‟s farm demonstrations under the provision that his work would be confined to areas 
previously infested. Based on Buttrick‟s initial meeting with Knapp, the GEB took a more 
ambitious view, deciding that the latter‟s improved methods could be honed, scaled-up and 
propagated more broadly. Thus Rockefeller associates did not devise the tactic of „education 
by farm demonstration‟. Typical of many philanthropic initiatives, the „solution‟ already 
existed but it was Rockefeller‟s uncommon vision, funding, energy and support via the GEB 
that enabled the transmission and expansion of demonstration activities 
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Indeed, Knapp appealed to the GEB precisely because he promised something 
different. For a start, he made clear his disagreement with conventional attitudes toward rural 
workers. „A great majority of those who have sought to improve rural life,‟ he wrote, „have in 
the main unconsciously assumed that the reason rural conditions are so generally primitive in 
the south, is because of ignorance; a lack of civic pride; no ambition; [farmers] cannot be 
reached; are intrenched [sic] in prejudice etc. There was never a greater fallacy – offer a 
farmer a genuine thing and prove it and no class of people is more responsive … There is 
general agreement that the rural conditions should be improved. The farmer believes it as 
strongly as the reformer‟ (Knapp, 1908, 3). 
 
Knapp‟s vision of farming hung on two key ideas. First, to effect lasting change one 
had to train, not teach. He believed that farmers had failed to adopt the best scientific 
practices primarily because scientists lacked the means to translate technical knowledge into 
idioms the farmer could readily understand and mimic. „The vast array of [agricultural] 
knowledge,‟ Knapp wrote to Buttrick, „must be reduced to a few simple principles, easily 
understood and of universal application.‟ Knapp‟s famous blueprint for farm improvement – 
what he tellingly termed agriculture‟s „Ten Commandments‟ – was an attempt to render 
complex knowledge (regarding soil quality, fertilisation, irrigation, plant spacing, crop 
rotation, seed variety and quality, animal husbandry, and the benefits of machine power) into 
simplified, instructional forms that could be relayed to farmers. „[One needs] to get down to 
where the people can understand,‟ he instructed Buttrick, „[to] touch bottom and lift‟ (cited in 
Evans, 1925, 3). 
 
Secondly, it follows from this that to reform farm habits necessitated a synergistic 
engagement with farm habitats. „The place to write this [agricultural] knowledge,‟ Knapp 
declared, „is on the soil. When written there it will be read by the farmer and understood by 
him.‟ It was not enough to make scientific improvements legible for farmers; the solutions 
had to be taken directly to the farm: „It must find the man and not compel the man to find it‟ 
(Knapp, 1908, 15). To accomplish this objective Knapp vigorously promoted rural 
„extension‟ work (employing county agents, home demonstration workers as well as boys‟ 
and girls‟ club participants) to show farm workers that even small changes in farming 
methods could yield startling results. Knapp was adamant that agents be, where possible, 
„farm people,‟ familiar with local conditions, and a believer in „education by demonstration‟. 
„It is of no use to send a carpenter to tell a tailor how to make a coat,‟ he solemnly declared, 
„even if he is pretty well read on coats. The tailor won‟t follow‟ (Knapp, 1906, 7737). To 
convert the farm from a place bound by traditional opinions and methods into a laboratory of 
progressive, experimental practices, instructors would have to familiarise themselves with 
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local mores, site-specific agricultural problems, as well as communal and familial influences. 
In a statement that recalls Laurance Rockefeller‟s address to the students at The Buckley 
School, Knapp declared that international social adjustments must begin domestically in the 
attitudes and minds of ordinary people: 
 
It is realized that the great force which readjusts the world originates in the 
home. Home conditions will ultimately mold the man‟s life. The home 
eventually controls the viewpoint of man; and you do all that you are a mind to 
do in the schools, but unless you reach in and get hold of that home and change 
its conditions you are nullifying the uplift of the school. We are reaching for the 
home. The matter of paramount importance in the world is the readjustment of 
the home. It is the greatest problem with which we have to deal, because it is the 
most delicate and most difficult of all problems (cited in Frysinger, 1924, 1). 
 
The crucial recognition here is that farming is a social product. In order to successfully 
implement agricultural reform, modernisers would need to engage with „the most delicate and 
most difficult of all problems‟: the socialisation of families. Earlier USDA farm improvement 
efforts had identified the home, and the domestic work of farm wives in particular, as a key 
crucible for interventions targeting the progressive reform of the „social‟ (Goldstein, 2012). 
Moving in these circles Seaman Knapp quickly became a fierce and most able exponent of 
this brand of liberal reform. In a set of recommendations to the GEB, Knapp crystallised the 
issues very clearly for the Board: 
 
There remains still the home itself upon the farm, and the women and girls of the 
home, as one of the problems of rural up lift. This problem, in my view, can not 
be approached directly. No matter how earnest or enthusiastic the reformer, he 
who goes directly to the country home and tells the farmer and his wife that their 
entire home system is wrong and that they ought to change, will meet with 
failure and even well merited opposition. Under such circumstances it will be an 
affront and almost an insult to an honest and industrious people. But what can 
not be accomplished by direct means can usually be accomplished indirectly 
(Knapp, 1910, 1). 
 
For many in the US South, the farm was above all a home. While cultivators earned a 
livelihood from the farm they also raised a family and built a social community around the 
hearth. To reform the farm was thus to reform the homestead – the very identities of rural 
toilers, on as well as off the field. Working in this sort of environment required sociological 
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nous and cultural sensitivity. While instructors would need to go „direct‟ to the farm, they 
would also have to implement reforms „indirectly‟ – often through subtle interventions in the 
governance and reproduction of the domestic realm – in order not to risk alienation or cultural 
offense. Above all, the demonstration worker had to be ever mindful that the central concern 
of farm improvement efforts was the modification of human behaviour. 
THE SOCIALISATION OF FAMILIES 
 
 
Figure 1. Red scare:  a map depicting the approximate area infested by the Mexican 
cotton boll weevil in 1909. Source: Rockefeller Archive Center, General Education Board, 
Series 1.4, Box: 694, Folder: 7155 
 
 
In collaboration with the USDA, Knapp‟s earlier instruction work had focused on helping 
farmers in effected states meet the specific threat posed by the boll weevil to the cotton 
harvest in the US South (Fosdick, 1962, 44; see also Giesen, 2011) (Fig. 1). With an injection 
of financial support from the GEB – which invested 925,750 USD from 1906 to 1914 – 
Knapp‟s „farm demonstration‟ method was trialled in Southern states unaffected by the 
destructive beetle (Waterhouse, 2013, 36). The scale of operations in the field increased 
concomitantly, with the number of men implementing Knapp‟s methods increasing from 49 
in 1907 to 700 in 1912 (Scott, 1970, 226). In addition to farm demonstration work, Knapp‟s 
agents also founded a network of agricultural societies in these trial regions. Boys‟ clubs 
focused on applying new crop growing strategies and young males dominated numbers in the 
corn growing, livestock, and poultry clubs that soon dotted the countryside. At the girls‟ 
clubs, members were encouraged to participate in bread-making, canning, the cultivation of 
vegetable gardens, orchard growing and „home economics‟ (including dress-making, budget 
control and farm accounts, kitchen arrangement, work planning, home furnishing, cleaning, 
decorating and the like). The social clubs for boys were popularly known as „farm maker‟ 
clubs and were deemed critical to effecting change in local growing practices, whereas those 
for girls were commonly called „home maker‟ clubs and were considered central platforms 
for refashioning domestic culture, communicating new principles of „good taste‟ and 
economic efficiency to the farm wives and mothers of the future (Evans, 1925, 20; see also 
Hoffschwelle, 2001). Overall these „junior extension programmes‟ were deemed an 
outstanding success. Agents found young members receptive to new ideas, more disposed to 
follow instruction and „on the whole, better demonstrators than their parents‟ (Evans, 1925, 
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18). Moreover, the child‟s ability to affect their parents‟ decision-making was keenly 
observed and applauded. The mentoring of young citizens was soon thought essential to 
changing the habits of their elders.  
 
 Knapp‟s extension workers were always eager to try novel methods to communicate 
their modernising message to domestic home makers and to ensure that the home, as well as 
the field, was a site of on-going improvement. In Kansas, an electronic food calendar was 
used to show the value of well-planned meals (Frysinger, 1924, 31). In Oklahoma, a targeted 
„drink more milk‟ campaign encouraged better adult and child nutrition. In New Jersey, 
Arizona, and Minnesota, the promotion of „home economics‟ included a „phase of the project 
affecting the home maker herself, in helping her to develop better ways of standing, lifting, 
walking, sitting, and other activities essential to her daily work‟ (Frysinger, 1924, 35) (Fig. 2). 
In Alabama, the use of „movable schools‟ proved particularly successful and was soon scaled-
up and implemented in other states (Mercier, 1921, 18). By pre-arrangement, a local 
farmhouse and its surroundings would be repaired and remodelled using local labour. 
Working under the instruction of Knapp‟s agents, terraces, poultry sheds and sanitary toilets 
were constructed and buildings cleaned and painted. „On the inside,‟ one report notes, „the 
women scrub, disinfect, renovate, and rearrange, so that when the school is over the house is 
like new. The object is first to impress on the community the value of these improvements, 
and second to teach farmers themselves how to do the work‟ (Evans, 1925, 21). In other 
states, farm specific campaigns, such as „clean up week,‟ were promoted and „score-cards‟ 
were piloted as a stimulant to „self-study,‟ continuous self-appraisal thought here as the 
quickest route to more efficient worker behaviour. In time the cultural power of motion 
pictures was harnessed to communicate more widely the ideas and values promoted by Knapp 
and his army of extension workers (see Mercier, 1921, 17; Frysinger, 1924, 22) (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 2. Disciplining the body: reformers advocated tailoring working surfaces to an 
optimal height for each homemaker to increase domestic labour efficiency and reduce 
injury. Source: Frysinger, 1924, 35. 
 
By the time the GEB ended its formal ties with the USDA in 1914, it had concluded 
that its extension work had been a phenomenal success. The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 
formalised farm extension work and at the same time a Home Demonstration Service was 
added to the USDA‟s portfolio (Scott, 1970, 288-313). Reports celebrated the resultant 
increase in rural productivity (and the subsequent boost to other sectors of the US economy) 
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and the filtering of a Protestant work ethic throughout the South, but especially among 
African-Americans. The incorporation of African-American men, as demonstration workers 
but especially as instructors (and in a context where they made up more than 50 percent of the 
rural workforce in several southern states), greatly worried white elites within segregated 
communities. Nonetheless Knapp was adamant that their inclusion had an important civilising 
effect through the promotion of modern agricultural methods, education and hygiene (see 
Crosby, 1986; Anderson & Moss, 1999, 85-108; Davis 2006). Where white extension work 
sought to birth a modern consumer class in the South, extension work among African-
American women sought to intervene in this „problem‟ population through reform of the 
home, encouraging modern hygiene and sanitation standards in order to combat fears of 
rampant „negro‟ reproduction and the transmission of disease (Domosh, forthcoming a). 
Others backed Knapp‟s employment of African-Americans on the grounds that rural 
stagnation, if left unaddressed, could lead to the outward migration of cheap labour and 
ultimately culminate in urban revolt. „The northward exodus of negro farmers,‟ wrote J. A. 
Evans (1925, 7) of the USDA‟s Office of Cooperative Extension Work, „embraced all classes 
– farm owners, tenants, and share croppers … That the negro agents‟ work was partly 
successful in checking the rush of negro farmers to the cities seems beyond question‟. 
Extension work thus incorporated explicitly racialised concerns and became a key tool by 
which „backward‟ regions and races could be readjusted, uplifted and integrated into the 
modern nation (Ring, 2012). Most importantly, however, the work of Knapp posthumously 
convinced staff at the Rockefeller Foundation, endowed and chartered in 1913, that 
agricultural development must be a programme of social adjustment as much as a technical 
mission. To re-organise rural life, Foundation leaders recognised that they needed to convince 
farmers to forsake their traditional agrarian world – and the sense of familiarity and security it 
offered – and embrace a new rural modernity. Moreover, it was felt that this mode of „life 
adjustment‟ could be accomplished in a way that respected the primary aim of philanthropy to 
instil habits of „self-help‟ and „self-reliance.‟ 
 
 
Figure 3. The progress of a campaign: a map depicting those counties of Tennessee in 
which demonstration work was conducted in 1932 (checked in blue) and those in which 
introductory work was commenced (dotted in red). Source: Rockefeller Archive Center, 
General Education Board, Series 1.4, Box: 694, Folder: 7154.  
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CULTIVATING GLOBAL CITIZENS 
 
In 1968, 300 international delegates were invited to New York for a Rockefeller Foundation 
symposium titled, „Strategy for the Conquest of Hunger‟ (Harrar, 1968, vi). The mood at the 
conference was palpably buoyant. In Mexico, where the Rockefeller-sponsored Green 
Revolution took root under the careful tutelage of Norman Borlaug (1914-2009), corn and 
wheat yields had doubled and potato yields had tripled. Seemingly overnight, Mexico had 
been transformed from a net importer to a net exporter of wheat (see Fitzgerald, 1986; Cotter, 
2000). The new varieties of wheat and corn were later exported to Pakistan, Peru, Columbia, 
East and West Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and the Philippines. In addition, the 
Foundation established formal programmes of technical assistance in Colombia (1950), Chile 
(1955), and India (1956) and a network of international agricultural research centres, 
including the International Rice Research Institute (1960) and International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (1966) established in the Philippines and Mexico respectively. The 
„Strategy for the Conquest of Hunger‟ thus marked a new, triumphant phase in an on-going 
agrarian strategy. The Trustees had decided that the Foundation ought to turn its attention to 
international matters, „to do what it can to work toward the provision of an adequate food 
supply for all‟ (Rockefeller Foundation, 1968, 3). „There have now been enough successes,‟ 
one review noted,  „to demonstrate clearly that most nations can, if they will, dramatically 
and rapidly increase agricultural output. Throughout the world, traditional or subsistence 
agriculture can and must be replaced with a highly productive, market-oriented system‟ 
(Rockefeller Foundation, 1968, 5, emphasis in original).  
 
Reflecting on these achievements, Roberto Osoyo, Director General of the Mexican 
Ministry of Agriculture, addressed the delegates at the conference, taking care to remind them 
that the path from „food deficits to food sufficiency‟ was built on the extension and 
demonstration work pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation. This work, he said, created an 
all-important conduit between agricultural researchers and farm producers. Through such 
channels new seeds, machinery, and fertilisers were brought to rural Mexico, but more 
importantly, direct contact with villages made possible the training of rural youth (via 485 
youth clubs that advanced skills in livestock breeding, vegetable gardening, trade crafts, as 
well as the „development of civic, sporting and social activities‟) and the education of women 
in the art of managing their households and improving their „families‟ surroundings.‟ „The 
change in the attitude of the individual brought about by an increase in his general fund of 
knowledge,‟ Osoyo (1968, 12) concluded, „definitely favors the possibility of his accepting 
new ideas, new practices, and new procedures that break existing barriers created by customs 
and ill-founded traditions that frequently act as curbs to progress.‟ This sanguine sentiment 
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was echoed throughout the two-day symposium. By pursuing agrarian strategies „on farms 
instead of on pilot projects,‟ commented India‟s delegate, Chidambaram Subramaniam, „we 
are compressing the time span of change‟ (1968, 16). „As a feat of human engineering,‟ he 
marvelled, „this has scarcely an equal in history‟ (Subramaniam, 1968, 20). 
 
What began as a GEB „template‟ for domestic rural improvement was fast becoming 
an agreed international „strategy‟ for channelling, directing, and eventually accelerating rural 
change (see Zimmerman, 2010; Domosh, forthcoming b). Whereas early modernisers – and 
we must include Knapp among this group – were primarily, though not exclusively, 
concerned with the health and prosperity of their own society, after the Second World War 
attention shifted to the world stage where widespread hardship and political independence 
were thought to be „dangers‟ that the Soviet Union might exploit in its efforts to bring 
communism to the „Third World‟ (Essex, 2009, 101; see also Rostow, 1960). As historian 
Michael Latham (2000, 6) makes clear, the once clear „boundaries between America‟s 
domestic culture and its external role‟ were rapidly dissolving (see also Farish, 2010). Indeed, 
the fact that Foundation officials and government ministers made a virtue of using martial 
metaphors to convey humanitarian concerns (the „conquest of hunger‟, the „war on want‟, and 
much later, „food security‟) indicates the degree to which hunger and the problem of rural 
malaise were tied to wider counter-insurgency efforts (Sommerville, Essex & Le Billon, 
2014; Essex, 2012). President Harry Truman‟s famous „Point Four‟ speech explicitly married 
modernisation efforts to the strategic objectives of the nascent Cold War. To contain the 
threat of the Soviet Union, the US needed a positive programme of reform that could deliver 
on Truman‟s grand promise of prosperity for all „areas needing development‟ (cited in 
Perkins, 1997, 144; see also Westad, 2005). Western science and technical knowledge were 
an intrinsic part of this development package, but for the seeds of change to flourish 
modernisers would first have to cultivate a global citizenry which, like the uplifted farmers of 
the US South, was „receptive‟ to modern concepts, institutions and incentives. Once again, 
traditional farm values and lifestyles seemed to be all that stood between modernisers and 
their goals.  
FORGING IMPROVED AGRONOMIC PRACTICES  
 
The Rockefeller Foundation, with its strong track record in agricultural modernisation, was 
central to this new mission. In addition to launching formal programmes of technical 
assistance (e.g. Colombia in 1950, Chile in 1955, and India in 1956) and a network of 
international agricultural research centres (e.g. the International Rice Research Institute and 
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the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, established in 1960 and 1966 
respectively), the Foundation deepened its commitment to better understanding the dynamics 
driving global agricultural development (see Smith, 2009; Felstehausen & Diaz-Cisneros, 
1985). To this end the Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs (CECA) – established in 
1953 and later renamed the Agricultural Development Council (ADC) – was tasked with 
training rural scientists and finding solutions to the „economic and human problems‟ 
associated with agricultural poverty in Asia (Mosher, 1970, 6). Although founded and 
primarily funded by John D. Rockefeller III (1906-1978) -– and thus formally separate to the 
Rockefeller Foundation (of which he was chairman, 1952-1972) – we intend to show that 
ADC‟s remit and methods were clearly synchronised with the strategic goals of the 
Foundation. 
 
Like other Rockefeller-sponsored programmes of this period, the ADC‟s objectives 
reflected Cold War logics (Stevenson & Locke, 1989). Sovereignty gaps, looming food 
deficits and unrestrained population growth were considered the „perfect storm‟ for 
communist subversion. As Jamey Essex (2012, 194) notes, „[h]unger‟s material presence as a 
manifestation of vulnerability represents both the actual existence of risk to geopolitical order 
and the failure to appropriately manage or control such risk, with potential repercussions 
across the entire world economic and political system.‟ Satisfying the immediate nutritional 
needs of hungry peasants was one method of silencing the pedlars of revolution, but the 
provision of handouts was never a sustainable strategy in the long-term. Instead, and echoing 
the GEB‟s earlier domestic and racial uplift strategies in the US South, broader structural and 
social reforms would be necessary to bring about the efficient administration of agricultural 
production and the acceleration of capitalist development. Within this context, strategies 
designed to orientate social exchanges away from subsistence living and toward commercial 
practices formed an integral part of counter-insurgency planning (see Cullather, 2006; 
Sackley, 2011). New seeds and high-input agriculture simultaneously offered a route out of 
poverty and, in the stadial thinking of development experts, a step toward a more market-
driven industrial society. By „conquering‟ hunger and stabilising rural livelihoods, Western 
modernity would signal its lasting triumph over communism. In short, rural development 
became a geopolitical imperative: to stave off a „Red Revolution‟ it was necessary to bring 
about a lasting „Green Revolution‟ (see Cullather, 2010, 179). 
 
According to Arthur Theodore Mosher (1910-1992) – known to friends as „Art‟ – 
President of the ADC from 1967-1973, plans for rural modernisation were hampered less by 
technical limitations than by social and psychological barriers. With a background in 
agricultural extension work and later trained as an agricultural economist – significantly his 
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doctoral supervisor was the Nobel Prize winning economist, Theodore W. Schultz, whose 
work on the economics of agricultural development and „human capital‟ proved a major 
influence (Schultz, 1964; 1968) – Mosher believed that the ADC needed to forge 
„modernization theory‟ into forms that were recognisable and attractive to a „largely illiterate‟ 
peasantry (Mosher, 1957, 268). Broadly understood, the objective was didactic and would 
begin with ADC efforts to exert greater influence over the content of training materials used 
by students and practitioners of rural development (White, 2013). 
 
Under Mosher‟s direction, staff at the ADC began the task of selecting case studies 
that illustrated „successful‟ development, identifying key socio-technical determinants and 
„accelerators‟ of rural reform, and synthesising these lessons into powerful sociological 
slogans for agricultural modernisation. The fruits of this work appeared in monograph form 
under the title Getting Agriculture Moving: Essentials for Development and Modernization. 
Authored by Mosher, the text was widely circulated, particularly in Asia, and was 
subsequently translated into dozens of languages (White, 2013). Getting Agriculture Moving 
was published alongside three sister volumes – Selected Readings to Accompany Getting 
Agriculture Moving (1966), Training Manual for Group Study of Getting Agriculture Moving 
(1966), and Case Studies to Accompany Getting Agriculture Moving (1967) – which taken 
together offer a critical window into ADC‟s thinking on rural uplift. 
 
As others have remarked, ADC‟s programme for reform marks a high point in 
modernisation theory (see White, 2013). Less noted, however, is the degree to which this 
international programme drew on rural policies developed domestically and much earlier in 
the century through the activities of the GEB. Indeed both Mosher and Knapp shared the 
belief that for farm reform to be effective it was necessary to make theory concrete – to „write 
it on the soil‟ to employ Knapp‟s felicitous phrase. Whereas Knapp concluded that to change 
the behaviour of farmers one had to act „indirectly‟ on their environment (the farm) to make it 
more amenable to greater productivity, Mosher spoke of the need to differentiate between 
„crucial‟ factors that influence farmer behaviour in a „causative sense‟ and those other 
„associational‟ factors that generate change „indirectly or unobtrusively within a matrix we do 
not completely understand‟ (Mosher, 1970, 10). For Mosher, there was a compelling need to 
create what he termed „propitious conditions‟ that would incentivise Third World peasants to 
exert maximum effort for food production. Here Mosher had in mind not merely the 
infrastructure for development – subsidies for machinery and fertilizers, food marketing 
systems, transportation networks, and the like – but the hidden human factors that shape a 
farmers‟ „internal impulse‟ and „choice-making‟ (Mosher, 1957, 248) (Fig. 4). Although the 
language they adopted differed (noticeably Mosher‟s writings bear the imprint of his training 
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in behavioural economics), both men conceived of „farming‟ as a nested social enterprise, and 
„development‟ as the means of acting on, and exercising control over, those messy spatio-
social relations (Fig. 5). As Mosher put it: „Agricultural development is a social product. It is 
not the result of farmers alone. It is the result of the activities of farmers and farm families, 
lawmakers, highway engineers, merchants, manufacturers, research workers, teachers, 
veterinarians, editors, and every citizen who participates in electing public officials and 




Figure 4. Diagram illustrating how agricultural development programmes interact with 




Figure 5. Diagram depicting the different ‘geographical’ components of modern 
agriculture. Source: Mosher, 1976, 78. 
 
 
 How to „find the man‟ in such a complex world, Laurance Rockefeller might well 
have wondered? For Mosher and his team the task was partly technical (for example, 
distinguishing between factors deemed „essential‟ for development and those that can 
„accelerate‟ agrarian change) and partly socio-psychological (for instance, mediating the 
forces that shape peasant attitudes and experiences). „The farmer is more than a cultivator and 
a manager,‟ declared Mosher. „He is a person and a member of two groups of persons that are 
important to him. He is a member of a family and he is a member of a local community or 
neighborhood. Much of what the farmer is as a person he owes to his membership in these 
two social groups. Much of what he can do as an individual is determined by them‟ (Mosher, 
1966, 28). Thus for development experts to be successful, they needed to get to grips with the 
realities of rural communities where religious leaders, village elders, and elected officials 
wielded enormous power, where farmers‟ wives often controlled the domestic realm and farm 
finance, where sons could be voices for progressive change (threatening „to leave the farm for 
the city unless more modern methods are adopted‟), and the natural „affection of husbands 
and fathers for their families‟ could shape the overall farm economy. In a lecture to aspiring 
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extension workers, Mosher [1978, 83] named such influential persons „conditioners‟. For 
Mosher, getting to grips with the activities of „conditioners‟ was important less because it 
promoted a better understanding of the rural sociology and more because these conditioners 
were the true „vectors for changing the decision-making of the father/farmer‟ (1966, 34; see 
also Cleaver, 1972, 179; White, 2013, 16).  
 
Note that Mosher is here making an important distinction between agriculture and 
agricultural development. While plant breeders, pathologists, soil scientists, entomologists, 
engineers and technicians had done much to modify the technical infrastructure of the farm, 
these innovations hardly touched the personal and social life of poor farmers. In other words, 
technology addressed agriculture, not agricultural development. Thus Mosher, like Knapp 
before him, placed great store in the role of extension workers whose „training methods‟ 
ought to include „conversations during farm and home visits, method demonstrations, result 
demonstrations, group meetings, farm tours, exhibits and fairs‟ (Mosher, 1966, 131). „[I]t is a 
mistake,‟ warned Mosher, „to limit the concept of the extension workers to that of being an 
errand boy peddling news about research‟ (1966, 133). To spur development, demonstration 
agents had to become an „encouraging companion‟ to farmers, urging them to question „why 
they do the things they do, and are they way they are,‟ and making them „aware of the 
alternatives‟ (Mosher, 1966, 31, 133). In short, in Mosher‟s view the path to successful 
development lay in the conditioning of the conditioners via grass-roots extension work. 
 
Mosher clearly believed that a spirit of inquisitiveness and openness were essential to 
agricultural modernization. In a related publication that addressed „agricultural development,‟ 
he even went so far as to assert that „the opposite of traditional [living] is “choice-making”‟ 
(Mosher, 1957, 248). „Farmers must not be induced to make “a change” in farming,‟ Mosher 
went on to argue, „but to shift from an attitude of tradition to one of continuous choice-
making in economic and political fields as well as in the narrow realm of farming practices, 
realizing that all of these vitally affect agricultural production‟ (1957, 248-249). For Mosher, 
„choice-making,‟ „values‟ and „attitude,‟ „motivation‟ and „aspiration‟ ought to be the 
watchwords of everyday individual conduct. These „intangible‟ qualities ultimately 
determined the pace of agricultural change and whether the initial „take off‟ would end in 
lasting improvements. What good is promoting new modes of agricultural production, he 
reasoned, without also stimulating a spirit of risk-taking in farmers? After all, commercial 
agriculture would yield few results unless farmers first become familiar with the „types of 
judgment‟ that a monetized environment required. „Thus, encouraging farmers to move from 
traditional agriculture to progressive agriculture requires the development of a wholly new 
habit of thinking, a new way of living‟ (Mosher, 1957, 248). The key idea for Mosher was the 
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„the educability of farmers.‟ „Education must equip people to understand, evaluate, choose, 
and take responsibility‟ (Mosher, 1957, 255-256). And within agriculture, farmers must learn 
make many choices: there are, for instance, important biologic choices (what plants to 
cultivate and animals to husband), economic choices (how to wisely allocate limited capital) 
and political choices (what forms of rule best serve improved farming. „In a progressive 
society,‟ Mosher concluded, „social attitudes and behaviour must increasingly be governed by 
understanding and by choice‟ (1957, 256-257). In short, the goal of agricultural development 
was to stimulate and orientate the farmer‟s conduct and aspirations so as to make subsistence-
level existence seem alien and commercial farming appear both desirable and imminently 
attainable. This process of transition from one mode of life to another must begin with 
interventions targeting the foundations of human behaviour. As Mosher (1978, 16) advised 
his students, „To teach John Latin it is not enough to know Latin; it is also necessary to know 
John.‟ 
THE HUMAN FACTOR 
 
It is worth pausing here to specify more precisely the calculus behind Mosher‟s depiction of 
rural modernization. We suggest that there are four critical things to note. Firstly, it is 
important to recognise a shift in thinking about rural peasants as hopeless „objects of 
opprobrium‟ (the phrase belongs to historian James Vernon [2007, 17]) to conceptualising the 
farmer as a kind of unfulfilled entrepreneur. Over and over again, Rockefeller agents depicted 
farmers as aspirational subjects who aspired to a better life for themselves and their families, 
but found themselves shackled by economic circumstances and their wider socio-political 
milieu. Rural modernisers thus rejected the conventional fatalistic view of peasants as 
primitive, idle, and mendacious, stressing instead that it was possible to rouse rural labourers 
and „upgrade‟ seemingly entrenched farming practices (see Murray Li, 2007). Human life and 
social conditions were now imagined and treated as perfectly mouldable. „Twenty years to 
Eden!‟ was the rallying cry of Rockefeller agricultural consultants (Stakman, 1955, 26). A 
future, better world was not only thought to be within reach; philanthropists offered a road 
map to realise this sunny paradise. 
 
 Secondly, it is important to recognise the emergence of „human capital‟ as a sphere of 
strategic calculation. The key person here is economist and Nobel Laureate Theodore W. 
Schultz who argued for a more comprehensive understanding of capital that included the 
notion of differential or relativised human capacities. Schultz (1993, 14) argued that human 
capital is best understood as a set of „capabilities‟ that are either „innate‟ (i.e. genetic) or 
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socially „acquired.‟ Since for Schultz (1962, 1) „the economic capabilities of man are 
predominantly a produced means of production‟ (i.e. features that are largely „acquired‟), 
development practitioners, and those seeking to nudge society toward greater productivity, 
needed to focus on strategies that help people take the utmost advantage of „income-
increasing economic events,‟ where „events‟ are understood to entail everything from the 
delivery of new seeds and credit systems to participation in further schooling and technical 
training. Above all this meant assisting people to „invest in themselves‟ – that is, to see 
themselves, and indeed their families, as an unrealised fund of wealth. In sum, advocates of 
this theoretical approach solicited people to understand themselves as „human capital‟ yet to 
be valorised (Schultz, 1959, 109; cf. Feher 2009). 
 
Undoubtedly Mosher was an important conduit between Schultz‟s thinking and the 
strategic objectives of the Rockefeller Foundation. In addition to being academically trained 
under Schultz‟s instruction, Mosher also worked closely with him under the auspices of the 
Ford Foundation‟s National Planning Association of which the former was a trustee. This fact 
informs our third point; namely that Mosher‟s ideas were quickly absorbed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and diffused internationally, not simply because they reflected fashionable 
thinking in behavioural economics, but because they seemed to align in a rather seamless and 
natural way with the philanthropic goal of „self-help‟ practised more than half a century 
earlier by Seaman Knapp. In his official history of the GEB, former President of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Raymond Fosdick (1883-1972), makes clear that Knapp disapproved 
of eleemosynary allowances and their federal equivalent, government handouts. In Knapp‟s 
opinion, a relief scheme „that is not based on self-help is like sending a man to hold up a sick 
calf. After a while they both get tired and fall down together‟ (cited in Fosdick, 1962, 42). For 
the farmer to truly thrive, Knapp insisted, he must generate his own solutions „on his own 
farm and with his own hands‟ (cited in Fosdick, 1962, 42). Mosher also stressed the 
importance of „knowledge gained with sleeves rolled up, in the heat of everyday labor,‟ and 
echoed his mentor Schultz in arguing that human capital, unlike many forms of physical 
capital, is „cumulative‟ and therefore „self-generating‟ (Mosher, 1957, 269, 416). Behavioural 
economics thus updated and extended the classical understanding of capitalist markets as 
„self-regulating.‟ For them the „hidden hand‟ that automatically adjusts market terms must 
embrace the „material hand‟ of the farmer, the true source of progressive social change. In 
this sense, encouraging farmers to consider themselves as investments – as human capital – 
was analogous to training them in the continuous practice of self-governed improvement.  
This modality of rule is roughly consonant with the observations of Dardot and Laval (2013, 
5) whereby „to govern is not to govern against liberty, or despite it; it is to govern through 
liberty‟ (see also Rose, 1999). 
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Fourth and finally, it is vital to recognise how the security imperatives of the Cold 
War fed into and indeed amplified efforts to shape and direct individual, domestic and 
community behaviour. Mosher, for example, argued that rural change was the first stage in 
catalysing far broader social reforms: 
 
We are likely to think and talk of agricultural development as being valuable 
only because it makes more farm products available for human use. In fact, it has 
an additional, and perhaps a more important product: it changes the people who 
engage in it. For agricultural development to occur, the knowledge and skill of 
the farmers must keep increasing and changing. As farmers adopt more and more 
new methods, their ideas change. They develop a new and different attitude 
toward agriculture, toward the natural world that surrounds them, and toward 
themselves. Their early successes in increasing production increase their self-
confidence. Their increasing contacts and transactions with merchants and 
government agencies draw them into closer acquaintance with the world beyond 
their villages. They increasingly become citizens, full members of the nation 
(Mosher, 1966, 11-12). 
 
Mosher‟s equation of nation building and international statecraft (Bashford, 2013, 196) with 
agricultural modernization recalls Seaman Knapp‟s vision for elevating „backward‟ poor 
white and African-American farmers in the US South, encouraging them to become full 
participants in capitalist modernity. In both cases, the attempt to lead people out of poverty 
was considered to be the most effective way of negating social and racial tensions that might 
otherwise threaten the political order. Development, thus conceived, became a form of social 
prophylaxis.  At the theoretical level, the aim was to anticipate social, political and economic 
trajectories in order to act in a forward-thinking, pre-emptive capacity – snuffing out 
problems before they metastasised into difficult and intractable crises.  In the words of Robert 
D. Calkins (1951, 7), one time Director of the GEB: „True philanthropy acts on reason to 
remove causes, rather than on emotion to alleviate distress. It seeks to provide cures, not 
palliatives – remedies, not relief. It works for enduring improvements that may be 
perpetuated, rather than transient gains that cannot be maintained.‟ 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Creating a Progressive Rural Structure (1969), Mosher recounts travelling across the 
Indo-Gangetic Plain with a friend who plainly enquired, „Will this region ever be as 
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productive as Iowa?‟ Pondering his interlocutor‟s question, Mosher realised that he had been 
„guilty of a common error.‟ „Too frequently,‟ he went on to explain, „we ask ourselves only 
“what should we do next?” We do not look far enough down the years, visualize what would 
happen ultimately, then work backward to the present as well as forward from where we are 
now developing our plans‟ (Mosher, 1969, xv). This sense of working „backward to the 
present‟ was a cardinal feature of Rockefeller-sponsored modernisation. By designing the 
future, reformers believed they could vanquish hunger and poverty, birthing a new world that 
aligned more clearly with US strategic interests. 
  
Conceiving the „design‟ was one thing; implementing it was a challenge of far greater 
magnitude. To transform listless peasants into useful, productive machines meant rethinking 
the process of modernisation itself. Although the Green Revolution is frequently associated 
with technical breakthroughs – and even a „technical bias‟ – arguably its singular 
achievement was to position human behaviour at the centre of its calculations. In this sense, 
its modus operandi may be said to be more social than technical engineering. Norman 
Borlaug drew attention to this fact in an address given in 1968: 
 
The most conservative man in traditional agriculture is the scientist, and 
sometimes I am not proud to be one of them. This is most discouraging. The 
scientist is a privileged person, the man who should lead us out of the wilderness 
of static, underproductive agriculture, and yet by his apathy and failure to 
exercise his unique vision, he keeps us in the swamp of despair. The scientist 
fears change because he is in a relatively privileged position in his own society. 
If there is no breakthrough in yield, he will not be criticized. But if he makes a 
recommendation and something goes wrong, he may lose his job. In many 
different countries there is no faith or understanding between the farmer and the 
scientist. Almost without exception the farmer says, “This man is a theorist. He 
is not a doer, and he can‟t help us.” In the past, this complaint was all too often 
valid, but today the situation is rapidly changing (cited in Wortman & 
Cummings, 1978, 337-338). 
 
Here, the echo with Knapp‟s criticism of the distant and disinterested agricultural scientist is 
unmistakeable. However, Borlaug was more likely recycling ideas popularised by the 
American economist Theodore W. Schultz. Like other Schultz-inspired Rockefeller 
consultants, Borlaug recognised that their technical efforts to revolutionise agricultural 
production would only succeed if they also instilled modern mind-sets and habits in 
individual farmers. The long-held traditions and mores of the farmer „should not be 
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considered immovable obstacles to development,‟ cautioned Mosher, „[for] development is an 
instrument in changing them‟ (1966, 36). Modernisers sought to catalyse social reform on the 
farm by inculcating in the entire farming family a desire to adopt the modern methods and 
market-oriented attitudes championed by the Rockefeller Foundation. We see pioneered in the 
extension work of Knapp and Mosher the ultimate goal of Rockefeller-sponsored agricultural 
development: „the modernization of [the peasant‟s] mind‟ (Ekbladh, 2010, 5; see also 
Cullather, 2010, 27). 
  
 The philanthropic imperative to „transform the world‟ continues into the present. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to trace the nature of contemporary agricultural development 
efforts and their multiple entanglements with international philanthropy. However, more 
modestly we can note that the politics of „self-help‟ remains a key pillar of contemporary 
Rockefeller Foundation philanthropy, most conspicuously through its on-going partnership 
with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in funding the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA) initiated in 2006. Indeed, at the World Economic Forum in 2008, Bill Gates 
outlined his own philanthropic vision of „creative capitalism‟ manifested through 
organisations such as AGRA:  
 
 [An] approach where governments, businesses, and nonprofits work together to 
 stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain 
 recognition, doing work that eases the world‟s inequities … [R]ecognition triggers a 
 market-based reward for good behavior. In markets where profits are not possible, 
 recognition is proxy; where profits are possible, recognition is an added incentive 
 (Gates, 2008). 
 
AGRA is part of a broader campaign intended to inspire a „renewed revolution‟ in agricultural 
development, but its roots in earlier philanthropic endeavours are clear and obvious. The 
expressed goal is to convert risk-averse African smallholders into entrepreneurial farmers 
willing to invest, both materially and affectively, in capitalist speculation. Indeed the 
originality of philanthropy is precisely this creation of new norms and rules that call on 
individuals to conceive of themselves as „masters of their own destiny.‟ Of course, then as 
well as now, the great irony is that this „awakening‟ occurs exactly at the moment that 
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Highlights for review 
 
 
 explores the origins and strategic investment in practices of ‘self-help’ by key 
American philanthropic foundations; 
 
 traces the relationship between domestic rural reform in the US and global 
agricultural development from the Cold War forward to the present; 
  
 shows how modernisation theory – as it applied to agriculture – was conceived as a 
form of social prophylaxis: a Green Revolution was designed to stave off a Red 
Revolution; 
 
 discusses the ‘problematisation of the farmer’ and argues that farmers were 
encouraged to invest, both materially and affectively, in capitalist speculation; 
 
 concludes that the mission to modernise Third World farming involved social as well 
as technical engineering. 
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